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A well developed financial system enhances competition in the industrial sector by allowing easier entry. 
The impact varies across industries, however. For some, small changes in financial development quickly 
induce entry and dissipate incumbents’ rents, generating strong incentives to oppose improvement of the 
financial system. In other sectors incumbents may even benefit from increased availability of external 
funds. The relative strength of promoters and opponents determines the political equilibrium level of 
financial system development. This may be perturbed by the effect of trade liberalization in the strength 
of each group. Using a sample of 41 trade liberalizers we conduct an event study and show that the 
change in the strength of promoters vis-à-vis opponents is a very good predictor of subsequent financial 
development. The result is not driven by changes in demand for external funds, or by the success of the 
trade policy. The relationship is mediated by policy reforms, the kind that induces competition in the 
financial sector, in particular. Real effects follow not so much from capital deepening but mainly through 
improved allocation. The effect is stronger in countries with high levels of governance, suggesting that 
incumbents resort to this costly but more subtle way of restricting entry where it is difficult to obtain 
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d 1. Introduction 
It has been extensively documented that the level of financial development, however measured, 
varies greatly across countries (LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998)). This does not imply that the ranking of 
countries does not vary through time. The rank in terms of level of private credit to GDP in the early 
1970s explains only 51% of the cross-country variance in the rank 25 years later
2. More than half the 
countries moved out of their position decile, with two out of seven countries moving out of their quartile. 
For instance, from having one of the least developed financial systems in the world, Bolivia became 
roughly the median country, with a level of private credit to GDP of 0.48 (as compared to 0.05 initially). 
Costa Rica, initially at the 55 percentile (private credit of 0.19), by the end of the 1990s had a level of 
financial depth comparable only to the African (0.14).  
Our theories of financial development need to explain at the same time the relatively high 
persistence in the indicators of financial depth and these non-trivial changes in the ranking across 
countries at different moments in time. Existing theories -that rely on stable and largely predetermined 
institutional features- successful as they are in explaining the cross-section variation, are challenged when 
applied to the time series dimension of the data. Moreover, if deep institutional factors are behind 
financial development the prospect for solving the problem is grim. Both Bolivia and Costa Rica inherited 
the same legal origin (in the line of LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998)), were colonized following a similar 
pattern (Acemoglu and Johnson (2003)), share a common religion (Stulz and Williamson (2001)), and are 
probably not very different in terms of social capital endowment (Guiso et al. (2004)) and many other 
institutional features. The difference in outcomes does not seem to be driven by the demand side either. 
Not only was Bolivia initially somewhat poorer than Costa Rica, but it also grew one and a half 
percentage points slower during the period. Moreover, both countries’ manufacturing sector composition 
was such that their aggregate demand for external finance was within half a standard deviation between 
one another and not significantly different from the mean (Rajan and Zingales (1998)). Nor does the 
difference seem to be related to the balance between bank and market-based systems, since neither 
country has a particularly well developed stock exchange (see Allen and Gale (1999) for a discussion on 
the issue).  
Rajan and Zingales (2003) propose a political economy view to understand the u-shape pattern of 
financial development during the 20
th century. The political economy approach seems sensible. On the 
one hand policies matter: financial system depth is not driven solely by differences in the general level of 
economic development –a proxy for the demand of financial services- but also by differences in the rules 
pertaining to financial systems and their enforcement (La Porta et al (1997)). It is also interesting to note 
                                                 
2 The figures mentioned in this introduction come from a sample of the 73 countries for which we have data 
on both financial system and trade indicators since 1970.   4
that financial sector regulations are very much ad-hoc and typically form a self-contained body of rules 
and enforcement reasonably distinct from other economic institutions. On the other hand financial 
development seems to exert a first order, positive impact on economic outcomes (King and Levine 
(1993), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Jayaratne and Strahan 
(1996), among others). More to the point, it has being documented recently that not everybody is equally 
affected (Rajan and Zingales (1998), Kroszner and Strahan (1999), Braun (2002), Raddatz (2003), Braun 
and Larrain (2004)). This literature is advancing our knowledge of the mechanism through which 
financial development has an effect on real outcomes. Putting this all together suggests that distinct 
policies affecting the development of financial markets are likely to have important distributive 
consequences. This should be fertile ground for finding political economy explanations
3.  
The political economy game we have in mind builds on the premise that a well developed 
financial system enhances competition in the industrial sector by allowing easier entry. There is some 
previous evidence on this mechanism. Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that most of the difference in 
growth between more and less external finance dependent industries across countries sorted by financial 
development comes from differences in the growth of the number of firms as opposed to the growth of the 
typical establishment. Cetorelli (2001, 2003) Cetorelli and Strahan (2003) show that lower degrees of 
banking competition are associated with larger firms across countries, across US states, and following the 
passage of the Second European Banking Directive. Here we further document this fact by showing that 
both aggregate manufacturing sector price-cost margins and average firm size –which we take as 
measures of incumbents’ rents or the inverse of the degree of competition in industry- are significantly 
negatively correlated with financial development across countries. This complements the literature that 
looks for a mechanism for financial development to affect real outcomes, and also early results on the 
interrelation between financial constraints and product market competition (Chevalier and Scharfstein 
(1995, 1996), Phillips (1995)).  
We show, however, that there is important heterogeneity on the impact of financial development 
on these measures across industries. In each industry, incumbents weight the benefits of easier access to 
external finance with the costs of increased competition. For some industries, such as beverages, leather, 
and food, margins fall more sharply and the number of firms rises more rapidly with financial 
development. This suggests that the costs of entry probably outweigh the benefits of easier access to 
external funds. Incumbents in these industries would probably oppose policies meant to improve the 
financial system. Incumbents in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, printing, and furniture, where margins 
                                                 
3 This approach, which has a long tradition in the analysis of regulatory reform dating at least since the 
seminal work of Stigler (1971), has only recently being applied to the regulation of financial markets. See 
Kroszner (1998) for a discussion of the issues when the framework is applied to banking and financial 
regulatory reform across countries.   5
are either little affected or actually increase, are more likely to favor them. We split the industries in two 
equal-sized groups along this dimension and call them the promoters and opponents of financial 
development. 
  The relative strength of each group determines the equilibrium level of financial system 
sophistication. Absent significant perturbations to this political economy equilibrium we do not expect 
significant changes in financial development. There has been, however, a significant change during this 
period which is that an important number of countries opened their borders for trade in goods. As stressed 
by Rajan and Zingales (2003), trade can have profound effects on the politics of financial development. 
The essence of the argument is that trade liberalization decreases incumbents’ rents and consequently 
both their ability and willingness to oppose financial sector development
4. Morck et al.’s (1998) evidence 
on the fall in stock price of Canadian firms controlled by old money families following the unexpected 
enactment of free trade with the U.S. is consistent with the general argument. However, Siegel (2003) 
finds that increasing openness in Korea actually strengthened the country’s most politically connected 
firms. We show here that on average the countries that liberalized trade during the last three decades of 
the 20
th century gained around 4 spots in the ranking of private credit to GDP. The figure is neither 
significant nor economically noteworthy. Both Bolivia and Costa Rica, for instance, liberalized trade at 
about the same time (1985 and 1986, respectively). While the first climbed many spots, the second was 
advantaged by around one-third of the countries. The average effect was positive but small. However, the 
fact that trade liberalization does not have much of an effect on average does not imply that it does not 
matter. The sign of the effect is most likely to be country-specific as the conflicting evidence of Morck et 
al. (1998) and Siegel (2003) suggest. Trade liberalization is a perturbation to the relatively high 
persistence of private credit. Among the countries that did not liberalize trade since the early 1970s the 
initial position in the ranking explains 67% of the variation in the final position. For those that liberalized, 
however, the dependence on history is completely broken -the initial ranking accounts for less than 5% of 
the final one. Therefore, we provide a way to reconcile the evidence showing that deep institutional 
factors determine to a great extent the cross-country level of financial development with the view that 
openness to trade changes things.  
Relative prices are profoundly and permanently affected by trade liberalization. Since the change 
in prices is a function of world prices, comparative advantages, and the initial structure, the effect of trade 
liberalization across sectors varies from country to country. In Bolivia the average price-cost margin of 
the promoters increased by 4.6 percentage points relative to that of the opponents. We label this figure the 
change in the relative strength of promoters. In Costa Rica, on the contrary, opening up for trade brought 
                                                 
4 Rajan and Zingales (2003) point out that the effect on financial development is likely to be stronger when 
the opposition of financial sector incumbents is muted by free flow of capital.    6
about a decline in the strength of promoters of measure -5.8. In the five years preceding liberalization 
Bolivia and Costa Rica’s private credit to GDP was on average 0.12 and 0.18, respectively. After five 
years had passed since liberalization and up to the tenth year, the average figure was 0.37 for Bolivia and 
0.12 for Costa Rica.  
We repeat this event study for a sample of 41 countries that liberalized trade and find that the 
change in the relative strength of promoters induced by trade liberalization is a very good predictor of 
subsequent financial development. The political economy variable alone explains around one-fourth of 
the change in private credit over GDP not accounted by its initial level and the fixed liberalization-year 
effects we also include in the specification. The result is robust to a battery of tests that includes 
controlling for demand-side determinants of financial development,  different strategies to classify 
promoters and opponents, the use of different event study windows, separating early and late liberalizers, 
excluding potentially influential industries, and several other changes to the specification. Bolivia and 
Costa Rica are good examples of countries in the first and fourth quartiles in terms of change in 
promoters’ strength. The economic magnitude of the effect when comparing these two groups directly is 
similar. The typical country in the first quartile experiences a relative strengthening of promoters of 5 
percentage points and an increase in private credit of 14 points of GDP (from 0.31 to 0.41). In the average 
country of the fourth quartile opponents are strengthened by 5 points and private credit increases just 3 
points (from 0.21 to 0.24).  
We adopt a de-facto approach throughout the paper with the rationale of testing the political 
economy view in the most general way. We avoid imposing our preconceptions about what factors 
determine whether an industry will tend to oppose or favor policies that develop the financial system. We 
do not impose structure on the effect of trade openness across industries, either. Both the classification 
and the effect of trade come directly from the data. Importantly, we do not focus a-priori on particular 
policies, but just measure the final effect on financial development. This stands in contrast to the approach 
of the recent literature on corporate governance which emphasizes this one determinant
5. It also 
differentiates this paper from the literature following Kroszner and Strahan (1999) that, although based on 
similar arguments about the differential effect across groups and the event study methodology, tend to 
focus on particular policies and case studies (interstate bank branching deregulation in this case). Our data 
have much richer variation in terms of number of countries, time period, and the within country 
dimension.  
                                                 
5 Some relevant papers in this literature include: Bolton and Rosenthal (2002), Biais and Recasens (2001), 
Ang and Boyer (1999), Pagano and Volpin (2000), Pistor (1999), Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001), Hellwig 
(2000), Biais and Perotti (2001), Johnson and Shleifer (2000).   7
Of course, we try to address the shortcoming of the de-facto approach. Despite not being able to 
directly show the groups influencing the government as in case studies (notably Kroszner and Strahan 
(1999)), we recognize that policy reform is at the heart of the mechanism we propose. With the caveat of 
limited data availability, we show evidence suggesting that the relation between the change in relative 
strength and subsequent financial development is indeed mediated by policy adjustments made in the 
five-year period following trade liberalization.  Policies that induce competition in the financial sector are 
particularly important. Moreover, we check that the real consequences of financial development are 
present, working not so much through increased investment but through improvement in the quality of 
capital allocation (as measured in the way of Wurgler (2000)). The question of why incumbents resort to 
financial underdevelopment to protect rents instead of using more direct forms of entry barriers is 
addressed. We show that our political economy story is especially strong in countries with relatively high 
levels of governance (as captured by the degree of rule of law, corruption, etc.). We interpret this as 
suggesting that incumbents resort to this costly but more subtle way of restricting entry when the degree 
of governance would make it difficult to obtain more blatant forms of anti-competitive measures from 
politicians. 
Wouldn’t the agents involved anticipate the financial effects of trade liberalization and internalize 
them in their decision to open up? The two reforms are not independent, and the relationship between 
them is not obvious (see, for instance, the arguments and results by Aizenman (2004), and Aizenman and 
Noy (2004)
6). We certainly do not pretend that ours is the whole story. We deal with this issue in a 
number of ways both theoretical and empirical. On the theoretical side it might not be obvious a-priori the 
exact effect of trade liberalization across sectors. Empirically we include only countries that liberalized 
trade so that the decision to open up has no effect on the coefficient for the political economy variable. 
Also, we include liberalization-year fixed effects to control for the timing of the decision. Finally, we 
recognize that many countries liberalize trade not as a consequence only of politics but also due to factors 
external to the country, so that the decision is not entirely endogenous. For many trade liberalization 
occurred as a result of IMF intervention. Since the IMF emphasis on financial market policies is relatively 
new, splitting the sample between early and late liberalizers, and showing a similar effect across them 
suggests that this reform interdependence does not bias our results.  
The paper is also related to the literature on the real effects of trade liberalization started by Sachs 
and Warner (1995) when showing the impact on growth. When showing that relative prices change 
distinctively across countries following liberalization we propose paying attention not just to the average 
effect of trade, but also the heterogeneity of it.  This has direct implications in terms of the political 
                                                 
6 These papers suggest that trade liberalization and capital account liberalization are endogenous. Here we 
focus on the development of the domestic financial sector instead.   8
economy of trade and relates to empirical work on the matter (see Rodrick (1996) for a survey). We also 
delve into the relationship between finance and trade, and so relate to Beck (2003), Svaleryd and Vlachos 
(2004). Finally, we show that particular policies adopted as a result of our political economy mechanism 
are indeed related to outcomes. In this sense the paper adds an additional layer of exogeneity to the 
literature on the effects of financial liberalization (Williamson and Mahar (1998), Abiad and Mody 
(2003)).    
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains our empirical methodology, 
including measurement issues and a discussion of the assumptions that are implicit in our approach. 
Section 3 presents the main result of the paper, the robustness tests, and the additional results regarding 
the mechanism underlying our political economy story. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Methodology and data 
Our empirical approach consists of testing whether a shock to the ability of different parties to 
influence politics in favor or against financial development affects the subsequent development of the 
financial sector. Our hypothesis is that when trade liberalization strengthens (in relative terms) those 
parties that favor financial development it will be followed by an increase in the depth of financial 
markets. We conduct an event study for 41 liberalizing countries and then explain the cross-sectional 
effect on financial development by running the following regression: 
  0 () cc c c FD STRENGTH PROMOTERS X α βγ ε ∆= + × ∆ ++  (1.1) 
where  c FD ∆  is a measure of the change in financial development and  () STRENGTH PROMOTERS ∆  
is a measure of the change in the relative strength of the parties that favor financial development (the 
promoters), both computed around the trade liberalization episode.  c X  is a general set of possible 
controls, and  c ε  is the error term, which may include several components. Our hypothesis implies that the 
coefficient β  should be significantly positive.  
In the rest of this section we explain how we identify the parties that favor and oppose financial 
development, justify our views of trade liberalization as a shock to the political economy equilibrium, and 
explain the measurement of the impact of trade liberalization on the strength of the different parties. The 
details of the specification will be discussed in section 3.2. The different data sources used at each step 
are discussed along the way.   9
2.1 Winners and losers from financial development  
There are many dimensions along which the development of the financial system can have an 
asymmetric effect across groups.  Although we could, in principle, identify winners and losers along each 
dimension, in our setting the basic source of conflict across groups comes from the effect that financial 
development has on the product market. The idea that finance has an effect on how firms conduct 
business is not new (see, for instance, Chevalier (1995), Phillips (1995)). Rajan and Zingales (2003), in 
particular, provide the basic mechanism on which we build here. They argue that a more developed 
financial system reduces the correlation between credit allocation and a borrower’s collateral and 
reputation, which facilitates the entry of new firms, increasing the degree of competition and reducing the 
rents of incumbents. 
Figure 1 suggests that the mechanism is indeed empirically relevant. Panel A plots, for a sample 
of countries, the average ratio of Private Credit to GDP during the 1980s and 1990s versus the average 
Price-Cost Margin in manufactures during the same period. The correlation is strong and significant (-
0.27, significant at the 0.2% level). The Price-Cost Margin (henceforth PCM) -computed using industry 
data from the Unido (2002) dataset- is defined as follows: 
 





PCM is essentially a measure of the profitability of incumbents, the flow accrued to the owners of capital.  
One can think of a number of refinements to this indicator –that would take into account the amount of 
capital invested and indirect taxes, in particular. Our choice is dictated primarily by simplicity and data 
availability. Since, as will be made clear below, we will not be using the level of PCM but will just rely 
on its within-country, cross-industry variation, the simplification is unlikely to be of first-order 
importance. The methodology implies that the fact that some industries have higher margins everywhere 
due to larger capital requirements or taxes (tobacco and oil, for instance), or that some countries exhibit 
higher margins across the board (perhaps due to a lower level of competition or higher regulatory 
requirements) will have no impact at all in our measurement.  
We are not the first to use PCM to proxy for the degree of product market competition. The 
measure has been shown to be strongly positively correlated with measures of concentration across 
industries (see for example Domowitz et al. (1986), Collins and Preston (1969), Clarke et al (1984), and 
Encaoua and Jacquemin (1980)). This correlation is shown in Panel B, which plots the average PCM   10
across U.S. manufacturing industries against the C-4 concentration ratio (the sales of the four largest 
firms in an industry to total industry sales)
7.  
As a robustness check we consider an alternative measure of how incumbents are differently 
affected by financial development based on quantity instead of price indicators. In particular, we measure 
the extent to which average firm size across industries is related to private credit. The ranking of 
industries along this dimension is quite similar to the one using the PCM measure. The correlation of the 
two variables is 0.58, significant at 1% levels. The results turn out to be basically same.  
Although incumbents seem to be, on average, worse off relative to potential entrants with an 
increase in financial development, the effect can vary significantly across industries. Industries where 
incumbents rents are (relatively) more affected by the development of financial markets are probably 
more willing to organize and spend resources to maintain policies that keep the financial system 
underdeveloped than those industries whose rents are unaffected by financial conditions.  
To identify the relative promoters and opponents of financial development we look at the effect 
of financial development on the PCM of 28 different three digit ISIC industries across countries by 
estimating the parameters of the following regression: 
  0 , ic i c i c ic
i
PCM FD α αα η ε =+++ × + ∑  (1.2) 
where  ic PCM is the PCM of industry i in country c,  0 α is a constant,  i α  and  c α are industry and country 
fixed effects respectively,  c FD  is the financial development of country c measured as the ratio of Private 
Credit to GDP (obtained from World Development Indicators 2003), and the  i η  measure the relative 
effect of financial development on industry i’s PCM. Both the PCM and private credit correspond to the 
averages for the period 1980-2000. 
The relationship between incumbent rents and financial development is, of course, quite complex. 
A number of industry characteristics are likely to be involved. Since there is not much previous research 
upon which to rely here, it is difficult to come up with good proxies for some potentially important ones 
(such as the importance of innovation or the minimum efficient scale). These characteristics may also 
interact in a complex and non-monotonic way to determine the total effect of financial development on 
margins. Our approach reflects these problems and takes an agnostic position regarding which industries 
we expect to be relatively more and less affected. We just let the data speak. Figure 2, which shows the 
                                                 
7 The concentration data was obtained from the U.S. Bureau of the Census. For the vast majority of 
countries in our sample data are not available to construct such a measure.    11
relationship between private credit and margins for two different industries (Beverages and Machinery), 
suggests that the effect is indeed heterogeneous.  
Two comments regarding the specification are in place before showing the results. First, the 
specification in equation (1.2) suffers from reverse causality. The reason is that when rents are high 
incumbents have more resources to persuade politicians to keep in place legislation that restricts the 
development of financial markets. We address this problem by instrumenting the measure of financial 
development. The instrument we use is a country’s legal origin, as it is standard in the law and finance 
literature (La Porta et al. (1997), Beck et al. (2000)). Second, because of the multicollinearity induced by 
the “dummy problem” we can only identify relative effects. So the  i η  coefficient capture the impact of 
financial development on industry i PCM relative to an arbitrary benchmark industry. 
The relative effects of financial development on the margins of different manufacturing industries 
(the η  coefficients), obtained from the estimation of equation (1.2), are presented in Table 1. Column one 
reports the estimated effects, and column two the standard deviations. The de-meaned values of the 
effects are reported in column three. A simple inspection of the table shows that there is indeed significant 
variation on the estimated effects across industries. A Wald’s test, reported at the bottom of the table, 
strongly rejects the hypothesis that all the effects are equal. This dispersion can be observed in Figure 3a. 
The figure plots the η  coefficients of each industry against its private-credit-weighted average PCM.
8 
Besides presenting the dispersion of the coefficients, the figure shows that the relationship is not 
materially affected by a few outliers. The relationship between the PCM and the size measure is depicted 
in Figure 3b. 
We use the η  coefficients to distinguish between those industries that favor (in relative terms) 
policies conducive to the development of the financial system (henceforth the “Promoters”) and those 
industries that oppose these policies (henceforth the “Opponents”). We identify the promoters 
(opponents) with those industries with a η  coefficient above (below) the median. This criteria has the 
advantage of simplicity and of taking into account the natural clustering observed in η .  
2.2  Measuring the impact of trade liberalization 
We estimate the impact of trade liberalization on margins across industries in each country using 
an event-study approach. That is, we consider trade liberalization as a discrete event that occurred at a 
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specific time for each country. The date of trade liberalization was obtained from Wacziarg and Horn 
Welch (2003) that updated the dates originally estimated by Sachs and Warner (1995).
9 A straightforward 
argument against this approach is that trade liberalization is a gradual process instead of a one time event. 
Although there is always some degree of gradualism in the implementation of reforms, an important 
aspect of trade liberalization is the removal of tariffs and quantitative restrictions that can have an 
immediate impact on the volume of commerce of a country. This can be seen in Figure 4a, which plots 
the average volume of trade as a fraction of GDP around the time of liberalization.
10 The figure shows 
that our liberalization dates do indeed capture a discrete break in the trend of the volume of trade for the 
typical country.  
Besides changing the volume of commerce, trade liberalization significantly affects margins, both 
in absolute and relative terms. This is especially important for our analysis because, as long as the ability 
or willingness of parties to influence policies depends on their rents, it justifies our use of trade 
liberalization as a shock to the political economy equilibrium. The absolute effect of liberalization on 
margins is shown in Figure 4b, which plots the evolution of the average PCM around the time of trade 
liberalization. The large decline in margins following the liberalization event is apparent.  
Of course, the political economy equilibrium is determined by the relative strength of the parties, 
so a common decline in margins across industries may not be sufficient to trigger a change in the 
equilibrium. To analyze the potential effect of trade liberalization on this equilibrium we define the 




i Promoters j Opponents
iP jO ij STRENGTH PROMOTERS PCM PCM share PCM share PCM
∈∈
=− = − ∑ ∑ w
here 
PROM PCM  and 
OPP PCM  are the average PCM of promoters and opponents of financial development 
respectively (as identified in section 2.1); and, for each industry i that belongs to the group of promoters 
(P),  , iP share  is the share of that industry’s value added in the total value added of that group ( , j O share  is 
defined analogously among the industries that belong to the group of opponents).  
Figure 4c illustrates how trade liberalization perturbs the equilibrium between promoters and 
opponents. The figure shows the median absolute deviation of the residuals of a regression of relative 
                                                 
9 The sample of countries used in the study and the corresponding dates of trade liberalization are reported 
below in Table 3. 
10 Volume of trade corresponds to the sum of exports and imports as a fraction of GDP, and was obtained 
from the World Bank World Development Indicators 2003.   13
strength on its lagged value around the liberalization date.
11 If changes in the relative strength across 
countries were just random, the median absolute deviation of the residuals would be stable around the 
event. On the contrary, we observe a spike around the time of the event that signals that trade 
liberalization has a significant heterogeneous effect on the relative strength of promoters across countries. 
This heterogeneity is critical for the ability of our political economy mechanism to explain the variability 
of the development of financial markets post-liberalization. Notice also that by year t+5 this relationship 
as well as the level of aggregate margins seem to stabilize.   
Based on the measure described above, the effect of trade liberalization on the relative strength of 
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where the shares are computed as above, except that they correspond to the average value in the five year 
window before liberalization,













∆= − ∑∑ , (1.4) 
so they are the change in average PCM of an industry in a five year window around the liberalization date 
τ . This measure of changes in average PCM at the country-industry level also allows us to look further 
into the heterogeneity of the effect of the event on margins of different industries. Within a country, the 
variation of the effect of liberalization on margins across industries (as measured by the standard 
deviation) is about seven percentage points. Within an industry, the variation of the effect across countries 
is also around seven percentage points. This variability of the effect on margins across both countries and 
industries ensures the power of the test described at the beginning of section 2. 
3. Results 
In this section we report the changes in financial development associated with trade liberalization. 
We show that the cross-country variation in financial development can be explained in part with our 
                                                 
11 The reason to use the median absolute deviation instead of the standard deviation or the 
2 R is that 
because of the small number of countries for which we can perform the exercise (average number of 
countries in a given event time is around 25) the last two measures are too sensitive to outliers. A robust 
measure of 
2 R obtained from a trimmed regression (not reported) gives similar results. 
12 By using the average shares before liberalization we are assuming that the liberalization has no effect on 
sectoral shares in the five year window, which is indeed the case. Results obtained using different shares 
before and after are analogous.   14
measure of the change in the political economy equilibrium. We check the robustness of the result, 
provide details of the mechanism, and use the liberalization experiment within the political economy 
framework to further explore the real effects of financial development.  
3.1 Trade and financial development 
We are certainly not the first to consider the relationship between trade openness and financial 
development. Rajan and Zingales (2003) show that the degree of world openness to trade and bank and 
stock market development both exhibit a U-shaped form in the 20
th Century. Stulz and Williamson (2001) 
find that in a cross-section of countries trade openness mitigates the influence of structural factors on 
financial development-enhancing policies. We present additional evidence of this relationship here. 
In Table 2 we provide summary statistics for a sample of 73 countries for which we have 
complete data for both trade openness and private credit to GDP during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. We 
split the data in two groups based on whether the country liberalized trade during the period or not, and 
compute a ranking based on private credit taking the average value in the 1970-74 and 1995-99 periods. 
The first panel reports statistics for the whole sample.  
The first thing to notice is that the countries that liberalized trade (first panel) advanced on 
average just 3.9 positions in the ranking of 73 countries. Aside from this figure not being economically 
noteworthy, it is not statistically significant either. The median change in the ranking is even smaller (1 
position). The data are not particularly supportive of the view that opening up for trade triggers financial 
development automatically. Notice also that the ranking of private credit is highly persistent in time. 
When considering liberalizers and non-liberalizers together (third panel) the rank correlation of the 
measures in the early 1970s and the late 1990s is 0.68. The countries’ initial position then explains more 
than 50% of their position more than a quarter century later. This persistence is more suggestive of deep, 
slow moving institutional factors being at the core of financial development.  
Consider, however, what happens when we compare the persistence across the liberalizer and 
non-liberalizer groups. While for the countries that did not open up for trade during the period the initial 
position in the ranking explains 2/3 of the variation in the final position, for the liberalizers it explains less 
than 5% and the correlation is not even statistically significant. Figure 5 makes the point graphically by 
plotting the relationship between initial and final rank for the two groups separately. Countries above 
(below) the upper (lower) straight line in each figure gained (lost) at least as many positions as to outpace 
(lag behind) 20% of the countries in their respective group. While over 60% of the liberalizers lie outside 
the region, only 23% of the non-liberalizers do so.   15
The data show that trade liberalization is a perturbation to the high persistence of private credit. 
There is then a way to reconcile the institutional view with the idea that opening the economy to trade 
changes matters. In the next section we show how one can use trade liberalization events and exploit the 
cross-country variation in its effect on financial development to understand the relationship. As it will be 
the case, our political economy story will prove to be critical. 
3.2 Trade liberalization and the political economy determinants of financial development 
The main result 
Using the measure of the change in the relative strength of the promoters of financial 
development defined in section 2.2, introducing some specific controls, and specifying the form of the 
error term, the benchmark specification described in equation (1.1) becomes 
0, (- )
PROM OPP
c event c c c event FD D FD PCM PCM δα β ε µ ∆= + × + × ∆ ∆ ∆ + + ,           (1.5) 
where  FD ∆  is the change in the ratio of bank credit to the private sector to GDP computed as the 
difference between the average ratio between t-5 and t-1, and the average ratio between t+5 and t+10 
(everything in event time); 
13  0 FD  is average private credit between t-5 and t-1;  event D  is a set of 
indicator variables for the year of trade liberalization; (- )
PROM OPP PCM PCM ∆∆ , the measure of the 
change in the relative strength of promoters, is defined as in equation (1.3); finally  and c event ε µ  are 
country and event error components.  ,, a n d α βδ are the parameters to be estimated. The coefficient of 
interest isβ , which according to our hypothesis should be positive and statistically significant.  
Table A1 shows the basic characteristics of the sample. There are 41 countries, 6 developed 
(Australia, Ireland, Korea, Japan, New Zealand, and Singapore) and 35 developing. Latin America is the 
largest group with 17 countries, followed by East Asia Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa with 6 each. The 
sample also includes three transition economies (Hungary, Poland, and Romania). Eight countries 
liberalized in 1991, four in 1996 and 1986 each, and three in 1990, 1989 and 1985. The mean (median) 
value of the change in private credit is 8% (6%) with a standard deviation of 19%.
14 The positive sign 
confirms previous cross-country evidence on the positive relation between trade openness and financial 
development. This is reassuring given the difficulty in interpreting cross-country relationships. Here 
                                                 
13 Notice that we do not include the years immediately after the event ( 5 to τ τ + ) to compute the level of 
post-event financial development because we assume that the political economy mechanism operates with 
some delay. Nevertheless, as it will be shown later, this assumption can be significantly relaxed. 
14 When considering all the 67 countries that had liberalized trade by 1995 and not just the 41 included in 
our sample there is still a significant, although smaller, positive sign.    16
fixed-country characteristics are implicitly controlled for, and although complete exogeneity cannot be 
claimed, the dependent variable at least follows in time the change in openness.  
Note, however, that although significantly positive there is important cross-country variation in 
the change in private credit that follows trade liberalization. A 95% confidence interval places the effect 
between 2.4 and 13.4 points of GDP. Moreover, for 12 of the 41 countries in the sample private credit 
actually decreases. This cross-country variation is what we seek to explain based on political economy 
considerations. The dispersion of private credit right before trade liberalization is, in comparison, quite 
small: 17% over a mean of 24%. The correlation between initial credit and its change is negative (-0.23) 
but not significant. The statistical moments suggest that, although significantly different from zero, there 
is ample variation across countries in the change in private credit that cannot be explained simply by 
initial conditions. The political economy variable is centered on a mean (median) of zero (-1%) with a 
standard deviation of 4%. 
Our sample only includes countries that did liberalize trade. Sample selection (i.e. the fact that 
some countries choose to open up for trade while others do not) potentially has an effect on the size of the 
constant in (1.5), however it plays no role in the identification of the coefficient for political economy 
variable. This is an important advantage of our methodology since we do need not worry about the 
interaction between the decisions to liberalize trade and the financial system. It is easy to imagine how 
these two interact; policy changes such as these are not typically accidental nor do they come alone. They 
are usually part of a broader transformation that drives these and other policy reforms. Chile’s reforms in 
the 1970s, Latin America’s changes, and Eastern Europe’s process in the beginning of the 1990s, are 
vivid examples of this link.  
This is not to say that we can safely treat trade and financial liberalization as independent, or 
more precisely assume that the former only has an effect on the latter through the political economy 
channel we propose and otherwise has no direct impact on it. There are other possibilities. One is related 
to the timing of liberalization. For instance, some countries may have liberalized trade when the rest of 
the world was more open to the flow of both goods and capital, which might translate to higher impact on 
trade volume and capital flows-induced deepening of bank credit. This could show up in our exercise 
through the political economy variable if relative world prices across sectors were themselves a function 
of global trade time-varying characteristics. These could be long-term shifts such as the decline of 
textiles. But they could also be related to the world economic cycle and the diverse cyclical properties of 
industries around the cycle (in terms of durability, for instance). Cyclical shifts would be more troubling 
since one would not expect the political economy equilibrium to change very much when impacted by 
non-persistent, short-term shocks. All these would map into our measure of change in margins and,   17
provided that it affects the two groups of sectors in a systematically different way, ultimately bias our 
results. To address the issue of timing in a very general way, specification (1.5) includes trade 
liberalization year fixed effects.  
Lastly, we allow for heteroskedasticity and the possibility of errors to be clustered around 
liberalization dates.  
The first column in Table 3 shows the basic result of this paper. The coefficient of the change in 
the strength of the pro-financial development group is positive and highly statistically significant. The 
initial level of private credit to GDP turns out not to be significantly associated with subsequent change in 
the variable after the event. Figure 6a plots the partial relationship between the change in private credit 
and the value of the political economy variable derived from the regression above. The figure makes more 
apparent the sense in which the mean change in financial development after liberalizations is not a very 
useful statistic in waging the relationship between one another. It also shows that there is no noticeable 
clustering around geographical or economic dimensions
15. This suggests the need for a non-evident 
additional variable to explain the cross-sectional heterogeneity. The political economy variable measuring 
the change in relative strength between those that promote and those that oppose financial development 
does a good job in explaining it. That variable alone explains around one fourth of the variation in the 
dependent variable not accounted for the initial level of financial development and the fixed effects. 
Furthermore, the relation does not seem to be driven by a few influential outliers but rather to be a robust 
pattern in the data. 
Figure 6b shows the time pattern of private credit around the liberalization event. The figure plots 
average private credit to GDP against event time separately for the group of countries that score above 
and below the median in the political economy variable
16. Before trade liberalization the two groups are 
remarkably similar both in terms of the level of bank credit (around 25% of GDP) and its evolution. 
Shortly after liberalization, though, the group of countries for which the shock advances the political 
prospects of improving the financial system shows rapidly increasing private credit, ending up at around 
45% of GDP or almost twice the value before the event. In contrast, in the countries where conditions for 
developing the financial system do not improve as much, private credit shows on average no significant 
change, ending up at roughly the same level as before. The post-liberalization difference between the two 
                                                 
15 Variables capturing geographical or economic proximity when included are almost always insignificant 
and they never affect the coefficient of the political economy variable in a material way (see some of them 
in the remaining of Table 2).  
16 This figure only considers the countries for which we have complete private credit data coverage for the 
+/- 10 years window around the trade liberalization event.    18
groups is quite large, comparable to the distance between Denmark and Ecuador or Chile and Libya in the 
1990s.  
Since the experiences of Bolivia and Costa Rica roughly match that of the average country in 
each group, we use them to further quantify the economic size of the effect. These two countries 
liberalized trade at almost the same time (1985 and 1986, respectively) and so probably faced similar 
external conditions for their financial development. In Bolivia the pro-financial development group turned 
out to be strengthened by trade liberalization increasing margins by 2.1 points while the opposing group 
was weakened losing 2.5 points in margin. Just the opposite happened in Costa Rica where the promoters 
lost 0.3 points and opponents gained 5.6. In relative terms in Bolivia the promoters were strengthened by 
a measure of 4.6 margin points while in Costa Rica they were weakened by 5.9 points. Despite having 
similar initial financial depth (0.12 and 0.18 respectively), following trade liberalization Bolivia trebled 
Costa Rica’s level (0.37 vs. 0.12).  
Interesting is also the case of Poland and Hungary. Glaeser et al (2001) document how different 
approaches to securities market regulation yielded startlingly different results in terms of the development 
of a market for equity. Although here we do not address the stock market development –which may be 
subject to a singular political economy mechanism- we complement the general argument by proposing a 
rationale for why the two countries adopted different policies. While, as a consequence of the opening up 
for goods trade, in Poland the promoters of financial development were relatively strengthened (by 1.4 
points), in Hungary they were weakened (by 2.3 points). Hungary started the process with a relatively 
developed banking system (a ratio of private credit to GDP of 0.38, not very different to that of Mexico in 
the 1990s), but ended up with roughly the same level as Poland (0.25) which had started with almost no 
banking system to speak of (0.04).  
Demand vs. Supply 
Of course, the result in the first column -although indicative- does not necessarily imply that 
financial development was formerly constrained by poor policy. Demand considerations are a real 
possibility. In fact, whether the level of financial development responds primarily to demand or to supply 
factors has been the main issue in this literature at least since the pioneering efforts of Goldsmith (1969). 
In our context, trade liberalization, and more generally the reform process, can shift the investment 
possibility frontier and thus alter the demand for funds. This would introduce omitted variable bias if the 
change in demand for funds happened to be correlated with the political economy variable. It is not 
obvious why this would be so, but it is always a possibility.    19
The following columns of Table 3 try to address the issue by adding controls thought to be 
associated to investment possibilities and the demand for funds. Neither the effect of liberalization on 
GDP growth nor its effect on the change in the investment rate seems to be driving our result (see 
columns two and three). When introduced in the regression they do not enter significantly nor do they 
materially or significantly affect the size of the coefficient for the political economy variable.  
It might still be the case that growth or investment take time to become visible or that they are 
just poor measures of the change in investment possibilities. Instead of trying to measure how the frontier 
shifts one can assume that countries were initially close to the frontier and that this shifts out to achieve a 
common level for all countries that liberalize (a level given by common world factors). If this is so a 
country’s initial position can be used as a measure of the distance to frontier or new investment 
possibilities. We approximate each country’s initial position with the average GDP per capita in the 5-
year period preceding trade liberalization. Alternatively, one can interpret this variable as measuring the 
ability of the country to finance new investment with internal rather than external funds if the stock of 
firms’ retained earnings is increasing with average country income. Again, adding this variable has no 
effect on our results. The positive (though insignificant) coefficient for initial income is inconsistent with 
either of the interpretations since both imply a negative effect.  
Of course, when we include initial per capita GDP we also mean to rule out simple explanations 
of why some countries developed financially following trade liberalization and others don’t.  
By changing the relative desirability to invest across sectors trade liberalization can have an effect 
on the aggregate demand for external funds. If margins increase more in sectors with higher demand for 
external funds aggregate demand would increase and therefore it would not be surprising to find that the 
stock of credit increases. This would not require arguing for supply-side constraints and political 
economy effects. The worry here is that we are just measuring external finance dependence and calling it 
the effect of financial development on industry rents. This is not the case as seen in column five where we 
add the trade liberalization-induced change in margins of highly externally dependent industries (ranking 
higher than median in Rajan  and Zingales (1998)’s measure for all firms) relative to less dependent ones 
as an explanatory variable. The variable enters insignificantly and does not affect the estimates for the 
political economy coefficient. Its sign is consistent with a different political economy effect where 
financial underdevelopment constrains potential entrants relatively more than it does incumbents in 
sectors with high need for funds
17. When incumbents in dependent sectors are relatively strengthened by 
                                                 
17 There is indeed a positive, though small, correlation between external finance dependence and the effect 
of financial development on margins.   20
trade openness, their views regarding financial development have a better chance of becoming actual 
policies and outcomes.   
The identification of promoters and opponents to financial development was based on a price 
measure because this is a direct indicator of the existence of rents in each sector. Rents are then taken as 
prima-face evidence of the existence of barriers to entry. One can alternatively rely on quantity measures 
that, although indirect, also suggest the existence of some sort of entry barriers. We compute the change 
in the strength of promoters to financial development substituting the effect of financial development on 
margins with the effect of financial development on average firm size across industries. The average firm 
size measure has been used before in similar contexts
18. The idea here is that if entry is restricted by poor 
financial development, growth in the industry will be more tightly associated to growth in the size of the 
typical incumbent rather than in the number of firms. The way average firm size correlates with financial 
development gives us a measure of the importance of financial underdevelopment as an entry barrier 
across industries. The ranking of industries along this dimension turns out to be almost identical to the 
one based on margins, and therefore to yield very similar results in terms of its power to explain trade 
liberalization-induced financial development (see lower panel).  
3.3 Further robustness 
In Table 4 we check the robustness of the results to a number of potentially important issues 
involved in the experimental design.  
We begin by considering a smaller window for computing the impact of trade liberalization on 
margins. Instead of considering 5 years before and 5 years after the event to compute the change, we use 
3 years
19. Our concern here is that if financial development is quick to respond after the event, our 
measure of final margins might by then be affected by this change. Since financial development is 
associated with larger margins for promoter sectors this would introduce an upward bias in the political 
economy measure for the countries that ultimately develop their financial systems more. Our result would 
be the product of a mechanical relationship. We already shown evidence that the impact on margins 
occurs within a small window of at most 3 years around the event. We provide a more direct check here. 
As can be seen in the first column in the upper panel, and despite losing a few observations because of 
data availability, the results are robust to this change. We experimented with window sizes between +/-2 
and +/-7 years and the results were never materially affected (not reported).  
                                                 
18 Among others, by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Cetorelli (2001, 2003) and Cetorelli and Strahan 
(2003). 
19 To be consistent, we also measure the initial and final level of private credit over windows of three years, 
both before the event and 5 years after the event.   21
The following column shows that when the dependent variable is measured as the change in the 
average level of private credit the three years preceding the event and the three years following it, the 
coefficient for the political economy variable is much smaller and not statistically significant. Then, there 
is no indication that financial development responds any differently across countries based on the political 
economy measure in the immediacy of the event, all the difference comes much after that. This speed of 
response of financial development is more consistent with an indirect rather than a direct effect of trade 
liberalization on financial development. It would have been worrisome to find that trade liberalization is 
followed by an almost immediate change in the level of financial development since that would require 
the change in political forces to translate into policies and policies to impact outcomes in too short of a 
period (on average 1.5 years), something difficult to imagine in our political economy context. In the next 
section we show how financial policy reforms that occur during the first five years following 
liberalization explain what subsequently happens with private credit. All this argues that the mechanical 
relationship is not a problem in practice.   
In the next column of Table 4 we try out measuring the final level of private credit not after the 
fifth year following trade liberalization but after 10 years have elapsed. The idea is to see whether there is 
truly a difference in private credit that is maintained in time or just a credit boom that follows trade 
liberalization. The distinction is important since previous research has shown that changes in private 
credit are associated with subsequent growth in the long-run but not in the short-run (Loayza and 
Ranciere (2001)), suggesting that only permanent differences in private credit can be identified as 
financial development. Since the coefficient for the political economy variable is not significantly 
different to that in our benchmark the results support the view that the event induces a permanent change 
in the level of financial development across countries
20. We think this pattern is also more consistent with 
structural policy-induced changes than with transient demand effects.  
Our computation of the effect of financial development on margins controls for both industry and 
country fixed effects. As long as taxes –or other regulations- are either country or industry specific, the 
measure adequately reflects how the relative flow to capital in each sector is affected by financial 
development. This is unlikely to be the case for two particular sectors: tobacco and petroleum refineries in 
which taxes probably increase with a country’s income. If so, the positive correlation between financial 
development and income per capita may be mapping into too large of an effect for both these sectors
21. In 
                                                 
20 This is still true when one computes the benchmark using only the countries included in this last sample, 
and when computing the final level of private credit 15 years later (neither of these are reported).  
21 Still, one has to take into account that in computing such effect we instrumented financial development 
with legal origin, a variable largely orthogonal to GDP per capita.   22
column (4) we drop both industries from all computations. The results do not appear to be sensitive to this 
change. 
Wouldn’t the agents involved anticipate the financial effects of trade liberalization and internalize 
them in their decision to open up? Said differently, why would some countries open up for trade knowing 
that this would unleash political economy forces leading to financial underdevelopment? The first thing to 
keep in mind here is that trade liberalization has been shown to have a positive effect (for the effect on 
growth, see Sachs and Warner (1995)), so that it may be worthwhile to open up even at the cost of having 
a relatively less well developed financial system. Second, our result shows that on average trade 
liberalization is associated with 8 points of GDP higher private credit; only a few countries actually 
decrease their degree of development in absolute terms. It might not be obvious a-priori the exact effect of 
trade liberalization across sectors (see, for instance, the argument put forward by Hausmann and Rodrik 
(2002)). In expectation the effect on subsequent financial development is in fact an additional benefit.  
Having included only countries that actually liberalized and also controlled for the timing of the 
decision, the issue speaks to the reasons for liberalizing trade and how these can interact with that of 
developing the financial system. Trade and financial liberalization do not necessarily come isolated but 
may be part of a reform process that includes both. To introduce bias in our estimation one needs to argue 
that the reason why some countries adopt them together and others don’t is correlated with the political 
economy variable.  
The degree of bundling of policies can be a function of local and external forces. In terms of the 
former, the outcomes of initial reforms may matter a lot in securing political support for the next round 
and keeping the reforming momentum (see, for the case of mass privatization, the formalization by 
Roland and Verdier (1994), and the vivid account of the Russian experience in Boycko et al (1995)). In 
our case it might be that the countries we see developing their financial systems faster do so not because 
the political balance between promoting and opposing incumbents change, but simply because the first 
round of reforms (trade liberalization) worked well and the liberalization process gained further political 
support. If the success of trade liberalization is for some reason correlated with our variable we would 
have omitted variable bias. We check this by introducing the effect of trade liberalization on the volume 
of trade, which we compute in the same way we do the effect on private credit. The results are shown in 
column one of the lower panel. The correlation between this variable and the political economy one is 
negative and non-significant, and when included in the regression appears insignificantly negative leaving 
the results mostly unaltered. Measuring success of trade liberalization with its effect on GDP growth or 
the change in the investment rate yields the same conclusion (see the previous table where these variables 
were used to measure demand for external funds).   23
Now from an ex-ante point of view, countries may liberalize trade when the external conditions 
are most favorable, for instance after a period of high terms of trade. High terms of trade could be 
positively correlated with the political economy variable if they were associated more tightly with the 
prices of opponent industries. If terms of trade mean-revert, this can map in a larger decline of margins 
for opponents and therefore a relative strengthening of promoters of financial development. The 
correlation between the change in the relative strength of promoters and the initial terms of trade (i.e. the 
average for the 5 years preceding trade liberalization) is positive, although small and not significant. 
When included as an independent variable in the benchmark regression (column two), the initial level of 
terms of trade does not enter significantly. Similar results were obtained when measuring the ex-ante 
incentives to liberalize with the growth rate of trading partners (column three).  We therefore find no 
evidence that countries that improved their financial systems further did so because they were better able 
to align the politics of trade and financial development.  
Cross-industry incentives can also be at the hart of the reasons to liberalize trade. For each group 
(promoters and opponents of financial development) we compute the average margin for those industries 
in the US in the period right before trade liberalization. We interpret the margin in the US as the 
(normalized) international price of output and take the difference of it across groups as an indicator of the 
relative incentive of promoters to liberalize trade. It may be that those countries that developed the 
financial system further just happened to be those in which promoters of trade and finance coincided, and 
not necessarily those in which promoters of financial development were strengthened by trade 
liberalization
22. This is not the case: this variable is virtually uncorrelated with our basic one and does not 
enter significantly in the regression (column 4).  
The politics of trade liberalization are, at least in this sample, not tightly intertwined with the 
specific political economy mechanism of financial development discussed here. The fact that almost all 
countries decided to liberalize in a relatively short period of time and that this time happened to coincide 
with the emergence of a strong international political agenda towards free trade points to the view that the 
trade process was more the result of external forces, and largely independent to the financial development 
ones.  
Still, these external forces can also be related to the bundling of reforms. One case would be that 
of a country subject to the structural reforms conditionality of IMF programs. The lack of variation in 
IMF involvement across countries in our sample (since 1970 the Fund has had programs outstanding in 
                                                 
22 The implications of this related mechanism in terms of the decision to open up for trade or not are quite 
interesting and merit further research. They are nevertheless out of our scope. Since we only have countries 
that did liberalize, we just need to worry about this reason being correlated with our explanatory variable.    24
all but 4 of the developing countries and these countries represent 35 out of our 41 cases) means that not 
considering this does not bias the estimation of our political economy effect
23.Now, the IMF did not begin 
seriously considering financial sector reforms in the conditions until the late 1980s: “Until the mid 1980s, 
structural reforms in (International Monetary) Fund-supported programs were typically confined to the 
exchange and trade system… While in the late 1980s, programs began to cover an increasing variety of 
structural measures…” (IMF (2001)). Taking advantage of this fact in columns five and six we estimate 
the benchmark regression separately for the sample of countries that liberalized before and after 1990. 
The sample countries are evenly split along this dimension. Both the coefficient estimates and overall fit 
of the regression are very similar for those countries more likely to have been pushed to bundle both 
reforms and those where financial sector reforms were probably not a condition. Therefore, if IMF 
involvement explains openness, it does not seem to explain the fact that some countries develop their 
financial systems and others don’t.  
We do not have data on the exact conditions imposed by each IMF program in each country. 
However, we can also measure the likelihood that the IMF involvement implied the commitment to all-
encompassing reforms (as opposed to just trade-related ones) with the ratio of funds disbursed to GDP in 
the period preceding trade liberalization. The variable enters positively (although not significant) in the 
regression. The coefficient of the political economy variable remains unchanged suggesting that, even if 
the extent of IMF intervention can explain in part the extent of reforms, this is not what the political 
variable is picking up.  
3.4 More on the mechanism 
Are the differences in financial depth related to policy changes? 
Up to now we have taken as given that financial development occurs as a result of policy 
improvement. We provided some evidence against it being associated just to demand factors, favoring a 
supply-side explanation. Policy is not the only factor constraining the supply of funds, though. Recent 
research has pointed out the importance of deep structural reasons for the heterogeneity in financial 
development across countries, among them legal structure (La Porta et al (1997)), social capital (Guiso et 
al (2004)), culture and religion (Stulz and Williamson (2003), and institutional development (Acemoglu 
et al (2004)). Of course, these slow-moving factors are not likely to explain time series changes in 
financial depth, at least not within the time interval we consider here. Still, we have not yet provided 
evidence that differential policy changes are behind the disparity of outcomes. This is important because 
                                                 
23 Since compliance with structural conditions is relatively low (see IMF (2001)), the Fund’s involvement 
could still affect our results through variation in the compliance with the conditions if it was positively 
correlated with our political economy variable.   25
policies are at the core of the political economy story. It will also allow a better understanding of the kind 
of reforms involved. The issue is, then, whether our political economy variable can explain subsequent 
financial development through policy reforms.  
Data on actual policy change are not easy to find and when available face a number of 
shortcomings related to sample and policy selection, and the amount of subjectivity involved. We use 
recent data from Abiad and Mody (2003). The authors extend the work of Williamson and Mahar (1998) 
and others, and construct indices for the degree of liberalization in 6 different policy dimensions related to 
the functioning of the financial system between 1973 and 1996. The dimensions considered are directed 
credit/reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry barriers/pro-competition measures, 
regulation/securities markets, privatization, and international capital flows. Each index goes from 0 to 3, 
with 3 indicating complete liberalization.  
This exploration comes with two costs. First, the sample is significantly reduced from 41 to 15 
countries. Fortunately this restricted sample is not peculiar. Regarding the main result of this paper (Table 
3, column one) there is no important difference between the behavior of these countries and that of the 
rest of the sample
24. Something worth keeping in mind when assessing the results below is that the 
precision of the estimates is, of course, reduced. Secondly, due to the smaller number of observations we 
have to drop the event time fixed effects to perform a meaningful estimation. Again, this is not of great 
concern since most of these liberalizations happen to be naturally clustered around a few years (6 in 1991, 
3 in 1986), meaning that most of the variation exploited is actually within liberalization years as before.  
With these caveats in mind, we review the results in Table 5. The specification is the same as in 
(1.5) with the exception that the change in each of the measures of financial policy liberalization is also 
included. This change is measured as the difference in the average of the indicator between t-5 and t-1 
and t+6 to t+10. The first column presents our benchmark regression in this reduced sample of countries. 
Although borderline insignificant (p-value 0.12), the coefficient for the political economy variable is 
remarkably similar to the one obtained before. In the following columns each policy indicator is added to 
the regression separately. If the effect of the change in the strength of promoters on financial development 
is working through policy changes in the five years following trade liberalization, the coefficient of the 
political economy variable should decrease importantly when we include the policy variable, and the 
coefficient of the policy variable should enter positively. This would be consistent with the joint 
hypothesis that the particular policy affects subsequent financial development and that the predictive 
                                                 
24 The inclusion in (1.5) of an indicator variable capturing whether the country belongs or not to the 
restricted sample, both alone and interacted with the other explanatory variables, is never statistically 
significant or economically relevant.    26
power of the political economy variable comes precisely from that relationship. Putting this together with 
the fact that the change in the strength of promoters comes from an independent event (the trade 
liberalization), and that it precedes the policy change in time, that result would be suggestive of the 
mechanism proposed. The alternative is that either the policy is not important or that the effect that the 
political economy variable is picking is not related to that particular policy.  
As can be seen from columns two to seven, the policy variable always enters positively, meaning 
that these policies do have an effect on financial development. However, the coefficient is significant only 
in the case of the lifting of entry barriers to the banking sector and the regulation of securities markets. 
The coefficient of the political economy variable drops significantly only in the case of entry barriers. Put 
together, and bearing the small number of observations and the difficulty of measuring policy in mind, the 
results are consistent with the idea that the change in the strength of promoters is translated into the lifting 
of entry barriers to the banking sector, which in turn generate a deepening of the financial system.  
The results obtained above adding each policy to the benchmark regression separately may be 
difficult to interpret because policy changes are likely to be correlated. However, we do not have enough 
degrees of freedom to include all the policy variables together and run a horse race. Instead, we create an 
index of policy liberalization. As the previous results suggest that all policies are not equally relevant in 
explaining financial development, we construct the index by giving more weight to those that are more 
strongly associated with financial development. We estimate these weights by regressing the change in 
private credit to GDP against the change in all the policy variables for all the years and countries in the 
1973-1996 panel considered by Abiad and Mody (2003). Changes are measured as the difference between 
averages in t-5 to t-1 and t+6 to t+10. The regression controls for time effects and the initial level of 
financial development. Consistently with the results above, the index turns out to give higher weight to 
entry liberalization, securities market regulation, and international financial integration. When the change 
in this index is included (column 8) the coefficient of the political economy variable drops importantly 
and the policy variable enters significantly. This suggests that an important part of what the change in the 
strength of promoters is capturing is indeed related to actual changes in the kind of policies that have an 
important effect on financial development.  
These results point towards the view that incumbents in the financial sector are important players 
in the political economy game (as hypothesized by, among others, Rajan and Zingales (2003)). Our view 
is that competition in the financial sector brings innovation in information and risk management and 
increased participation, all of which echo higher financial depth. Financial sector incumbents enjoy the 
quiet life and rents associated with low financial development. It is not obvious, however, that their rents 
would diminish when credit and interest rate restrictions are lifted or when the securities market is better   27
regulated. It is likely, then, their opposition to these reforms will be much weaker than towards increasing 
competition in the industry. It follows that no particularly strong change in the politics of financial 
development among non-financial incumbents might be needed for the former policies to be enacted. 
Kroszner and Strahan (1999) document how the incentives for financial sector incumbents to restrict 
competition are indeed related to policy outcomes in the case of the relaxation of U.S. bank branching 
restrictions. These results add to previous literature trying to determine the effect of policy on financial 
repression, in particular on financial development. It does so by adding an additional layer of exogeneity 
to the policy variables. Not only pro-competition policies precede financial sector development in time 
(see for instance Caprio et al (2001), Williamson and Mahar (1998), Fanelli and Medhora eds. (1998)), 
but they still do so when these policy changes can be motivated by a shift in the political economy 
context.  
Capital deepening vs. improved allocation 
Financial development has been associated with higher economic growth (King and Levine 
(1994), Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Rajan and Zingales 
(1998)). By overcoming informational and agency problems, a well functioning financial system can 
foster growth through two main channels: by increasing the amount of resources available for investment 
and by better allocating these scarce funds. We can provide some new evidence on the matter by asking 
whether the shock to the political economy equilibrium is associated with increased investment and/or 
improved allocation.  
Computing investment is relatively straightforward, coming up with a measure of the quality of 
capital allocation is more involved. We follow Wurgler (2000) and compute the sensitivity of investment 
growth to value added growth across industries in each country. This is interpreted as the quality of 
capital allocation because it is high when a country increases investment more in its growing industries 
and decreases investment more in its declining ones. The change in this variable around trade 
liberalization is computed in a manner analogous to the case of private credit. Due to lack of data on 
investment for many countries in our sample we end up with just 12 observations and we are again forced 
to drop the event fixed effects. The small time windows we use mean that the measures are surely much 
noisier than those computed by Wurgler. With these warnings in mind, the first column of Table 6 shows 
that the change in the relative strength of incumbent groups is positively and significantly associated with 
an improvement in capital allocation quality. Aggregate investment over value added of the industries in 
the same group of countries used above increases (column two).  However, the effect is economically 
small and not statistically significant.  The results provide some indication that it is allocation what gets   28
more affected. This again points to the importance of considering conflict across industrialists in 
explaining policy and ultimately financial development.   
Why would incumbents want to use financial underdevelopment as the mechanism to protect rents? 
One important question regarding our political economy mechanism remains. Why would 
industrial incumbents use financial underdevelopment when there are many other more direct and 
presumably more efficient ways to protect rents? Direct regulation of entry seems a better alternative. 
Djankov et al (2002), for instance, present cross-country evidence suggesting that regulation of entry 
rather than serving the public interest is better understood in a public choice framework.
25 Indeed, the 
countries that regulate entry the most tend have less open political participation, less controls over the 
government, and to be more corrupt. They also seem not to achieve the traditional stated goals for 
regulation.  
The effect of good governance and more open participation in our context is ambiguous, though. 
On one hand, they rule out gross intervention favoring ways that are more subtle, less apparent to the 
public to achieve the same outcome. While it might no longer be possible to just go and buy monopoly 
power from politicians, it could still be possible to achieve a similar goal by supporting regulation that 
restricts entry to the banking system invoking, for instance, the need of preserving safeness and 
soundness. On the other hand, it is possible that better governance makes the political system more 
responsive to the demands of different constituencies vis-à-vis the desires of the political class or the 
median citizen.   
In Table 7 we add to the benchmark specification the interaction between the political economy 
variable and governance measures. First, note that none of these measures displace the political economy 
variable which remains as significant as before and implies similar economic effects. Nor do they seem to 
have much of an impact on the coefficient of initial financial development. Both the direct and interactive 
effects of these measures are always positive, but only the interactions seem to be robustly significant. 
Except in the case of voice and accountability, the coefficients for the interacted variables are 
significantly positive.  
Financial underdevelopment seems, then, to be a second best, more sophisticated method to be 
used when the institutional development is such that it only allows subtle interventions. Said a little 
differently, the results can be interpreted as implying that a minimum level of institutional development is 
needed to jump start financial development once political conditions are appropriate. When the law has 
                                                 
25 Their results, however, are not conclusive in terms of the effect of entry regulation on product market 
competition or incumbents’ rents.    29
little value and corruption is rampant, the effect of shifts in the strength of different groups on financial 
development is diminished arguably because other means of protecting rents seem much more efficient. 
Similarly, when the public has little political power and government officials are not accountable, the cost 
to them of grossly misbehaving declines. We interpret the political stability effect as measuring the 
constraints faced by the politician class given the value of reputation. Finally, the balance between 
policies that manifestly favor particular groups and less obvious ones seems to be reflected in the general 
perception on the government’s effectiveness. 
We did not find the more specific measures of the role of the different branches of government to 
have major impact on the relationship between the political economy variable and subsequent financial 
development (not reported). Also, the high correlation between the governance measures did not allow us 
to tell the effect of each one apart.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper showed that the trade liberalization-induced change in the relative strength of 
promoters vis-à-vis opponents of financial development is a very good predictor of subsequent changes in 
financial sector depth. The paper also provided evidence on the importance of finance for the product 
market, documenting a mechanism through which financial development has real effects on the economy. 
The political economy variable derived from the analysis allowed us to –at least partly- solve causality 
issues and determine the kind of policies that cause financial systems to develop. Finally, we extended 
previous cross-country evidence on the effect of financial development on capital allocation to the time-
series dimension.  
From a policy standpoint the results of this paper are important in two ways. First, although deep 
institutional reasons play a role, to an important extent, countries have the level of financial development 
they choose. Policy convergence to best-practice standards is not likely to happen automatically unless 
the political economy conditions for such a change are present. Identifying and co-opting potential 
opponents might be necessary to ensure the political sustainability of reforms. Second, policies that on 
average have a liberalizing effect on markets are not by themselves enough to guarantee their extension to 
the financial system. They can even worsen the situation. In this sense, understanding the interrelation 
between sectoral reforms, and adjusting the timing accordingly seems of first order importance.  
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Table 1. Financial Development and Industry Margins 
The table shows the coefficients obtained for the industry dummies that capture the sensitivity of each industry's price-cost margin to financial 
development in a regression of the price cost margin of each industry in each country on an industry dummy, a country dummy and an industry 
dummy interacted with each country's level of private credit (this last dummies are the ones reported below). The data for the regression 
corresponded to averages of the variables for the period 1980-2000. The parameters were obtained by 2SLS, instrumenting the level of private 
credit for each country's legal origin. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by country. The bottom of the table shows 










Food 311 - -0.036
Beverages 313 -0.007 -0.08 -0.043
Tobacco 314 0.187 -0.249 0.152
Textiles 321 0.01 -0.039 -0.026
Apparel 322 0.045 -0.042 0.009
Leather 323 -0.036 -0.048 -0.071
Footwear 324 -0.038 -0.05 -0.074
Wood 331 -0.003 -0.057 -0.038
Furniture 332 0.052 -0.043 0.016
Paper 341 0.052 -0.048 0.016
Printing 342 0.088 -0.053 0.052
Industrial Chemicals 351 0.075 -0.059 0.039
Other Chemicals 352 0.198 -0.065 0.162
Refineries 353 -0.181 -0.067 -0.216
Petroleum 354 0.039 -0.072 0.004
Rubber 355 0.043 -0.048 0.007
Plastic 356 0.047 -0.051 0.012
Pottery 361 0.038 -0.063 0.003
Glass 362 0.126 -0.048 0.09
Other Mineral 369 0.044 -0.045 0.009
Iron 371 0.068 -0.047 0.032
Other Metals 372 -0.049 -0.048 -0.085
Fabricated Metals 381 0.06 -0.045 0.024
Machinery 382 0.049 -0.047 0.013
Electrical Machinery 383 0.031 -0.048 -0.005
Transportation 384 0.021 -0.055 -0.015
Professional Equipment 385 0.046 -0.064 0.01
Other 390 -0.007 -0.045 -0.043
Test all coefficients equal
P-value 0.0001
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Table 2. Persistence of Financial Development and Trade Liberalization 
 
Whole Sample (73 countries)
Mean St. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum
Private Credit Rank in 1995-99 37.0 21.2 37.0 1 73
Private Credit Rank in 1970-74 37.0 21.2 37.0 1 73
Change in Rank 0.0 0.0 0.0 -28 48
Share of Variance of Rank1995-99
explained by Rank1970-74 51.0%
Rank Correlation Private Credit 1970-74 / 1995-99 0.677***
Liberalizers (28 countries)
Mean St. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum
Private Credit Rank in 1995-99 29.6 15.9 30.0 3 67
Private Credit Rank in 1970-74 25.7 14.5 22.5 4 64
Change in Rank 3.9 19.1 1.0 -28 48
Share of Variance of Rank1995-99
explained by Rank1970-74 4.6%
Rank Correlation Private Credit 1970-74 / 1995-99 0.136
Non-Liberalizers (45 countries)
Mean St. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum
Private Credit Rank in 1995-99 41.6 22.9 48.0 1 73
Private Credit Rank in 1970-74 44.0 21.8 49.0 1 73
Change in Rank -2.4 13.5 -1.0 -25 32
Share of Variance of Rank1995-99
explained by Rank1970-74 67.0%
Rank Correlation Private Credit 1970-74 / 1995-99 0.756***
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 3. Trade liberalization and the political economy determinants of financial 
development 
The dependent variable is, for each country, the change in private credit to GDP between the period t-5 to t-1 and the period t+5 to t+10, where t 
denotes the year in which the country liberalized trade. UStrengthPromoters is the difference between the average (value added weighted) 
change in the price-cost margin of the promoters and opponents groups. Promoters (opponents) are those industries that score higher than median 
in the measure of the effect of financial development on margins (Panel A) and average firm size (Panel B). The change in the price-cost margin 
for each group is computed as the difference in the margin between the period t-5 to t-1 and t to t+5. UPCM
highly dependent-UPCM
less dependent is 
difference in the change in margins of the group of industries that score higher and lower than median in Rajan and Zingales (1998)’s index of 
external finance dependence. The computation is analogous to that of promoters and opponents. Errors (in parentheses below each coefficient) 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and allow for clustering by year of trade liberalization. Liberalization year fixed effects included but not reported. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Panel A: Margins Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Initial Private Credit to GDP -0.086 -0.051 -0.1345 -0.235 -0.098
(0.148) (0.167) (0.182) (0.207) (0.146)
UStrengthPromoters  2.398***  2.288***  2.395*** 2.411*** 2.633***
(0.631) (0.664) (0.646) (0.701) (0.714)
GDP growth 0.057
(0.332)
Change in Investment rate -0.3034
(0.855)







Observations 41 39 38 40 41
R-squared 0.563 0.572 0.564 0.670 0.568
Panel B: Size Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Initial Private Credit to GDP -0.0484 -0.019 -0.112 -0.123 -0.057
(0.175) (0.200) (0.215) (0.337) (0.166)
UStrengthPromoters 1.995*** 1.902** 2.006** 1.906*** 2.412**
(0.665) (0.852) (0.701) (0.630) (0.991)
GDP growth -0.032
(0.359)
Change in Investment rate -0.214
(0.801)







Observations 41 39 38 40 41
R-squared 0.506 0.5194 0.512 0.517 0.514
Robust, event time clustered errors in parentheses. Event time fixed effects included  but not reporte
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    37
Table 4. Trade liberalization and the political economy determinants of financial 
development: Robustness 
The dependent variable is, for each country, the change in private credit to GDP between the period t-5 to t-1 and the period t+5 to t+10, where t 
denotes the year in which the country liberalized trade. UStrengthPromoters is the difference between the average (value added weighted) 
change in the price-cost margin of the promoters and opponents groups. Promoters (opponents) are those industries that score higher than median 
in the measure of the effect of financial development on margins. The change in the price-cost margin for each group is computed as the 
difference in the margin between the period t-5 to t-1 and t to t+5. Panel A. Column (1) computes the impact of trade liberalization on margins as 
the difference between the period t-3 to t-1 and t to t+3. The change in private credit to GDP is measured between the period t-3 to t-1 and the 
period t to t+3 in (2), and between the period t-5 to t-1 and the period t+10 to t+15 in (3).  (4) excludes the observations corresponding to tobacco 
and refineries from the measure of UStrengthPromoters. Panel B. Change in Volume of Trade is computed as the change in the ratio of imports 
plus exports to GDP between the period t-5 to t-1 and the period t+5 to t+10. Ln(Initial Terms of Trade) is the average Terms of Trade 
(1995=100) in t-5 to t-1. Initial GDP pc growth of Trading Partners is the average from t-5 to t-1 of the growth rate of partner countries weighted 
by the share in total trade. Initial US margin promoters – opponents is the average margin (t-5 to t-1) in the US of promoters minus that of 
opponents.  Initial IMF Disbursement to GDP is the average ratio of IMF disbursements to GDP between t-5 and t-1. In (5) only data 
corresponding to countries liberalizing before 1990 is considered. In (6) only data corresponding to countries liberalizing after 1990 is 
considered. Errors (in parentheses below each coefficient) are robust to heteroskedasticity and allow for clustering by year of trade liberalization. 




( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )
Initial Private Credit to GDP -0.233 -0.138 -0.047 -0.048
(0.155) (0.127) (0.081) (0.165)
UStrengthPromoters 2.012** 0.606 3.01** 2.238**
(0.714) (0.476) (1.083) (0.985)
Observations 35 38 32 40
R-squared 0.615 0.503 0.517 0.590
Panel B
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )
Initial Private Credit to GDP -0.099 -0.094 -0.109 -0.100 -0.114 -0.055 -0.057
(0.213) (0.159) (0.159) (0.161) (0.292) (0.164) (0.267)
UStrengthPromoters 2.264*** 2.389*** 2.295*** 2.419*** 2.256** 2.695* 2.424***
(0.672) (0.678) (0.617) (0.658) (0.771) (1.312) (0.758)
Change in Volume of Trade to GDP -0.144
(0.211)
Ln(Initial Terms of Trade) -0.036
(0.310)
Initial GDP pc growth of Trading Partners 0.031
(0.051)
Initial US margin promoters - opponents -0.149
(0.285)
Initial IMF Disbursement to GDP 0.192
(3.066)
Observations 38 39 41 41 21 20 32
R-squared 0.575 0.562 0.571 0.564 0.574 0.534 0.526
Robust, event time clustered errors in parentheses. Event time fixed effects included  but not reported.
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Table 5. Trade liberalization and the political economy determinants of financial 
development: The policy link 
The dependent variable is, for each country, the change in private credit to GDP between the period t-5 to t-1 and the period t+5 to t+10, where t 
denotes the year in which the country liberalized trade. The independent variables correspond to the difference in the change of each policy index 
between the period t-5 to t-1 and the period t to t+5. The indices are taken from Abaiad and Mody (2003). Errors (in parentheses below each 
coefficient) are robust to heteroskedasticity and allow for clustering by year of trade liberalization. Liberalization year fixed effects not included. 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Initial Private Credit to GDP -0.275** -0.275 -0.257* -0.330*** -0.274 -0.124  -0.255 -0.297*
(0.102) (0.151) (0.131) (0.055) (0.195) (0.187) (0.159) (0.125)
UStrengthPromoters 2.345 2.500* 2.485* 1.030 2.622** 2.426 2.368* 1.953***
(1.297) (1.110) (1.261) (0.984) (0.801) (1.434) (1.211) (0.416)
Credit Liberalization 0.037
(0.057)
Interest Rate Liberalization 0.016
(0.032)
Entry Barriers Lifting 0.206*
(0.088)




Capital Account Liberalization 0.046
(0.052)
Financial Policies Index 1.894**
(0.774)
Constant 0.205*** 0.162** 0.184** 0.019 0.096 0.117 0.134** 0.000
(0.052) (0.045) (0.059) (0.106) (0.072) (0.098) (0.048) (0.089)
Observations 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
R-squared 0.258 0.286 0.263 0.693 0.541 0.325 0.293 0.712  
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Table 6. Trade liberalization and the political economy determinants of financial 
development, Capital deepening or improved allocation? 
The dependent variable in (1) is the change in a measure of the quality of capital allocation. Based on Wurgler (2000), this is computed for each 
country as the change in the sensitivity of growth of investment on growth in value added measured between the period t-5 to t-1 and t+5 to t+10. 
In (2) the dependent variable corresponds to the change in the ratio of fixed capital formation to value added in the manufacturing sector in each 
country. Again, the change is measured between the period t-5 to t-1 and t+5 to t+10. UStrengthPromoters is the difference between the average 
(value added weighted) change in the price-cost margin of the promoters and opponents groups. Promoters (opponents) are those industries that 
score higher than median in the measure of the effect of financial development on margins. The change in the price-cost margin for each group is 
computed as the difference in the margin between the period t-5 to t-1 and t to t+5. Errors (in parentheses below each coefficient) are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and allow for clustering by year of trade liberalization. Liberalization year fixed effects included but not reported. * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
(1) (2)
Initial Capital Allocation Quality -0.761**
(0.231)







R-squared 0.5469 0.355  
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Table 7. Trade liberalization and the political economy determinants of financial 
development, Why use Financial Development? 
The dependent variable is, for each country, the change in private credit to GDP between the period t-5 to t-1 and the period t+5 to t+10, where t 
denotes the year in which the country liberalized trade. UStrengthPromoters is the difference between the average (value added weighted) 
change in the price-cost margin of the promoters and opponents groups. Promoters (opponents) are those industries that score higher than median 
in the measure of the effect of financial development on margins. The change in the price-cost margin for each group is computed as the 
difference in the margin between the period t-5 to t-1 and t to t+5. In each column the independent variables indicated are included. Errors (in 
parentheses below each coefficient) are robust to heteroskedasticity and allow for clustering by year of trade liberalization. Liberalization year 
fixed effects included but not reported. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Initial Private Credit to GDP -0.252 -0.034 -0.105 -0.110 -0.115
(0.174) (0.290) (0.181) (0.092) (0.210)
UStrengthPromoters 2.289** 20.863** 2.842**  3.229*** 2.452***
(0.827) (9.376) (1.010) (0.433) (0.716)
3.983***
(1.245)


















Observations 41 32 41 41 41
R-squared 0.784 0.796 0.712 0.834 0.802
Political Stability x                         
UStrengthPromoters
Government Effectiveness x                     
UStrengthPromoters
Voice and Accountability  x                       
UStrengthPromoters
Rule of Law x                                          
UStrengthPromoters
Lack of Corruption x                         
UStrengthPromoters  41
Table A1. Sample Characteristics 
Bank Credit to Private Sector / GDP
Initial Final Change
Argentina 1991 0.22 0.22 0.00 -0.009
Australia 1964 0.19 0.24 0.06 -0.003
Bangladesh 1996 0.17 0.28 0.11 -0.057
Bolivia 1985 0.12 0.37 0.25 0.046
Brazil 1991 0.43 0.30 -0.13 -0.061
Chile 1976 0.08 0.59 0.51 0.047
Cameroon 1993 0.23 0.08 -0.15 0.029
Colombia 1986 0.15 0.15 0.00 -0.001
Costa Rica 1986 0.18 0.12 -0.06 -0.058
Ecuador 1991 0.12 0.25 0.13 -0.047
Egypt 1995 0.24 0.54 0.30 0.152
Ethiopia 1996 0.06 0.23 0.17 -0.051
Ghana 1985 0.02 0.05 0.03 -0.014
Guatemala 1988 0.17 0.15 -0.02 -0.016
Honduras 1991 0.25 0.32 0.07 -0.035
Hungary 1990 0.38 0.25 -0.12 -0.023
Ireland 1966 0.33 0.27 -0.05 0.006
Israel 1985 0.71 0.62 -0.09 -0.019
Jamaica 1989 0.24 0.23 0.00 -0.017
Jordan 1965 0.17 0.23 0.06 -0.042
Japan 1964 0.74 0.86 0.12 0.015
Kenya 1993 0.20 0.25 0.05 -0.028
Korea 1968 0.12 0.33 0.22 0.001
Sri Lanka 1991 0.20 0.29 0.09 -0.002
Morroco 1984 0.17 0.18 0.02 -0.006
Mexico 1986 0.15 0.28 0.13 0.000
Nepal 1991 0.11 0.27 0.15 -0.015
New Zealand 1986 0.20 0.87 0.67 -0.004
Panama 1996 0.55 0.95 0.40 0.011
Peru 1991 0.07 0.25 0.18 -0.014
Philipines 1988 0.22 0.41 0.19 0.088
Poland 1990 0.04 0.23 0.20 0.024
Romania 1992 0.53 0.09 -0.44 0.021
Singapore 1965 0.36 0.52 0.16 -0.007
El Salvador 1989 0.07 0.04 -0.03 0.005
Trinidad and Tobago 1992 0.33 0.32 -0.01 0.081
Turkey 1989 0.18 0.20 0.03 -0.057
Tanzania 1995 0.12 0.05 -0.06 -0.016
Uruguay 1990 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.001
Venezuela 1996 0.14 0.10 -0.04 0.005
South Africa 1991 0.52 0.69 0.17 -0.017
Mean 0.24 0.32 0.08 0.00
Median 0.19 0.25 0.06 -0.01
St. Dev. 0.17 0.22 0.19 0.04
Correlation with:
Initial Credit 1.00 0.58 -0.23 0.06
Final Credit 1.00 0.66 0.25
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Figure 1. Financial Development and Competition 
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Figure 2. Financial Development and Margins: Beverages and Machinery 
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Figure 3. Financial Development, Margins, and Average Firm Size across Industries 
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Figure 4. Effect of Trade Liberalization 
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Figure 5. Persistence of Financial Development and Trade Liberalization 
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Figure 5. Political Economy Determinants of Financial Development 
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